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SOURCE Ch'un-chung Jih-pao.

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTHWEST  
DUE TO CADRE INEFFICIENCY

A five-point work program among minority nationalities in Northwest China for the remainder of 1952 calls for the concerted extermination of bandits and armed counterrevolutionaries, according to a report submitted to the fifth plenary session of the Northwest China Military and Administrative Committee on 29 April 1952.

The report, submitted by Wang Feng, chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Committee, Northwest Military and Administrative Committee, and published in the Sian Ch'un-chung Jih-pao of 12 May 1952, indicated that armed counterrevolutionary rebels are still operating secretly in the Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan, and Ku-yuan areas of Kansu and in the Ang-la area of Kwei-te Hsien in Tsinghai.

This report contradicts a statement made by Wang Feng to the second plenary session of the Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities last December, published in the Sian Ch'un-chung Jih-pao on 13 February 1951, announcing that after 2 years of concerted effort, the roving bandits in the Northwest border areas were basically eliminated, and that the extermination of bandits had achieved tremendous results.

Wang Feng blamed the cadres for the present situation and warned that their shortcomings could incite dissatisfaction among the minority nationalities on which secret enemies are always ready to capitalize.

The other phases of the program mentioned by Wang Feng's report call for: (1) continued consolidation and expansion of the democratic united front of the nationalities and broadening the unity among these groups; (2) further steps to advance regional autonomy and continued establishment of coalition governments; (3) large-scale training of minority nationality cadres; (4) continued revival and development of agricultural and livestock production, and (5) expansion of health services and trade.

- 1 -

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Pertinent portions of the report relating to the elimination of counter-revolutionaries and bandits are given below:

In eliminating the bandits, political tactics as well as armed force must be employed to crush them. Propagandizing of all types of policies, whereby the masses will be imbued and aroused, must be expanded. Only after political means to disband the bandits prove ineffective should they be exterminated by force. As for the masses who were coerced into joining the bandits, they need not be further investigated if they return home and engage in production. Relief and free medical treatment should be given immediately to the masses who were plundered and injured. If those elements who are helping the bandits break away and return to their families they will be given the same magnanimous treatment. If the leaders of the agitators cease their vicious acts, hand over their arms, and pledge their allegiance to the government, their punishment will be lightened. But if they persist in opposing the government, they must be thoroughly wiped out and eliminated.

During the past year, some cadres over-estimated the results of their work. For this reason, in certain areas problems have arisen in all types of mass activities which were not strictly controlled or dealt with in accordance with established policies. For instance, during the land-reform program in the Moslem farming areas, there was improper disposal of certain mosques and land; but these mistakes were subsequently corrected. The method of work employed by the cadres was not only simple but also impulsive. They treated all landlords alike without proper regard to various types of landlord within this class who should have been dealt with individually. They did not rally the democratic persons around them or extend to them protection and special consideration.

The cadres offered no clear-cut policy or ideology to the patriotic democratic persons and the leaders among the masses who cooperated in common causes. They did not consult these groups or actively assist and guide them toward achieving results, nor did they win their confidence. On the contrary, the cadres lacked enthusiasm, and their democratic working style was inadequate.

All these shortcomings can incite dissatisfaction among the masses. The estrangement of the cadres from the realistic conditions of the minority nationalities also permits the hidden enemy to capitalize on these dissatisfactions. The counterrevolutionary armed rebellions in Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan, and Ku-yuan areas of Kansu and the Ang-la area of Kwei-te Hsien in Tsinghai clearly indicate that the concealed enemy is constantly searching for an opening to inflict destruction.

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- 2 -

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